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ABSTRACT
Several studies have examined the country-level effects on multinational 
enterprises that go into the developing countries, including the least developed countries. 
Few studies have considered the firm-level effects. This study uses the multilevel 
modeling method as outlined by Klein and Kozlowski (2000), Raudenbush and Bryk 
(2002), and Bliese and Hanges (2004) to examine whether there are any systemic patterns 
of multinational enterprises across the least developed countries. This paper uses 
information on foreign affiliates in the least developed countries to examine the overall 
trends of multinational firms in the least developed countries. Using data from the United 
Nations’ most recent report on foreign affiliates in least developed countries (UNCTAD, 
2011), I apply a multilevel approach to the size variations between foreign affiliates 
within the least developed countries. I find no significant systemic effects on the 
variations in firm size at either the country-level or industry-level. These results lead us 
to conjecture that the variations in size are idiosyncratic rather than systemic.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
This paper uses the multilevel modeling method (also referred to as hierarchical 
modeling and random coefficient modeling) to examine the link between the 
multinational enterprises and the least developed countries. In doing so, it adds to our 
understanding of the nature of multinational enterprises, brings the least developed 
countries into the broader discussion of developing countries, and bridges the firm level 
versus country level divide. 
Why do multinational enterprises have affiliates in the least developed countries? 
The answer to that question may seem quite simple: low wages, raw materials, and 
distance to market. Interestingly, more recent research has examined why multinational 
enterprises would avoid the least developed countries, and most theories predict just that: 
least developed countries have few multinational affiliates because of high hazards, large 
home-host distance, fragile host states, and even managers’ personal preferences. Yet, 
despite the predictions, several multinational enterprises not only do business in the least 
developed countries, but also have foreign affiliates within these countries. 
The least developed countries are also some of the least researched countries 
when it comes to international business (Ault & Spicer, 2014). Some research has looked 
at certain phenomenon within the poorest countries. These phenomena include 
microfinance (Ault & Spicer, 2014), entrepreneurship (Ault & Spicer, 2016), base-of-the-
pyramid innovations (Prahalad & Hart, 2002), and advantages of developing-country 
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multinational enterprises going into the least developed countries rather than into 
developed countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008: 22-32). 
In contrast, much of international business research has sought to understand the 
multinational enterprise from many angles: boundaries of the firm (Kogut & Zander, 
1993), nature of the multinational enterprise compared to domestic enterprises, for 
example, border spanning (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008), and strategic decisions of 
multinational enterprises, including entry modes into developed and developing countries 
(Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
Furthermore, while much of the research of the least developed countries in 
economics and sociology is in the areas of economic and political development, a handful 
of scholars have applied those theories to understanding businesses within the least 
developed countries. Even then, most theories suggest explanations of why we see so few 
businesses in the least developed countries (weak institutions, fragile states, political 
uncertainty, poor markets). A few theories attempt to explain why a multinational 
enterprise would conduct business in the least developed countries (low wages, access to 
raw materials, easier entry into market for developing-country multinationals). Much of 
the international business literature has examined firm level effects of multinational 
enterprises and country and supra-country level effects of institutions (in a wide variety 
of types and definitions) on economies and firms within economies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MULTILEVEL MODELING
This paper uses the multilevel or random-coefficient-modeling methods to 
examine the link between the multinational enterprises and the least developed countries. 
In doing so, it adds to our understanding of the nature of multinational enterprises, brings 
the least developed countries into broader discussion of developing countries, and bridges 
the firm level versus country level divide.  
The hypotheses in this paper span multiple levels: affiliates in multinational firms, 
firms in industries and countries, and industries in countries. This is important because 
many calls for research explicitly urge the need for such complex analysis to further 
interdisciplinary research (e.g. Cheng, Birkinshaw, Lessard, & Thomas, 2014; Cheng, 
Henisz, Roth, & Swaminathan, 2009).  
Several disciplinary fields touching international business have called for 
interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research (Ault & Spicer, 2016; Cheng et al., 2014; 
Cheng et al., 2009; Dunning, 1989; Molloy & Ployhart, 2012). However, due to the 
complex nature of multidisciplinary research, many have tried while few have succeeded 
in answering that call (Ault & Spicer, 2016). 
One of the most difficult challenges to multidisciplinary work is the need to 
include analysis at multiple levels (Hitt et al., 2007). This paper looks at multiple levels 
of analysis from affiliates within multinational firms to firms that operate within 
industries and span multiple countries. While at first this may seem like a simple task, 
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understanding why multinational enterprises have affiliates in the least developed 
countries is a much more nuanced and level-spanning question. Multilevel modeling is 
useful in multiple disciplines and fields. 
As relates to the question here in this paper—why do multinationals do business 
in the least developed countries? —the general answers have been in a macro framework. 
For example, the strength of institutions in the host country or the ability of firms to 
avoid institutional voids allow for firms to conduct business in difficult places (Khanna, 
Palepu, & Sinha, 2005; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). Others point to the 
ability of emerging country multinationals having an advantage in doing business in the 
least developed countries over doing business in the developed countries (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2008). Still others point to social entrepreneurs or altruistic companies 
desiring to alleviate poverty, either for profit or for charity (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Bruton, 
Ketchen, & Ireland, 2013). All the above are reasons multinational enterprises might or 
might not do business in a least developed country. However, these explanations use 
macro level (national) influences to predict and explain micro level decisions (firm 
location).
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL APPLICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
Since multilevel modeling can help us deal with complex, emergent phenomena, 
this paper will look at how micro-level theories of interactions between firms leads to a 
macro-level economic benefit at the country level. First, imitation and mimetic 
isomorphism are well developed theories that help us understand the actions of firms 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993). Second, theories of knowledge flows 
within country borders and theories of industry clusters give us a clearer picture of how 
the imitation among firms may occur (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Kogut, 1991; Kogut & 
Zander, 1993, 1995). Finally, theories of poverty, especially, base-of-the-pyramid, 
question whether businesses can make a profit while serving the world’s poorest regions 
(Kolk, Rivera-Santos, & Rufin, 2014; Prahalad & Hart, 2002). 
The theories related to imitation and knowledge transfers give us a micro-level 
picture of firm actions and performance. In the following sections, I use these theories as 
a starting point to move between firm and country levels of analysis.  
3.1 IMITATION 
People tend to wait for someone else to make the first move. The same goes for 
businesses. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) first addressed the issue of isomorphism into 
the sociological theories of business activities. Isomorphism is a sociological idea (or 
phenomenon) that explains how individuals (people, organizations, teams, firms) within 
groups (any collective) tend to show similar characteristics. The idea is that most 
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members in any group will change over time to be more similar than different. DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) applied this logic to organizational fields, claiming that businesses 
also show the same tendencies towards becoming more similar as individuals do within 
groups. 
Levitt and March (1988, in Henisz & Delios, 2001) showed that firms imitate 
trail-blazing firms. Haveman (1993) demonstrated an inverted-U pattern of isomorphism 
among firms, showing that firms will follow leaders’ entry moves into a certain location 
up to some point and then begin to taper off. Late-comers generally see the market as 
overcrowded, thus fewer entries into a location once the market seems saturated 
(Haveman, 1993). Haveman (1993) also found that smaller firms followed the strategies 
of larger firms, and all firms (small and large) followed the strategies of profitable firms. 
Henisz and Delios (2001) expanded the DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
organizational field isomorphism theory and the Levitt and March (1988) follow-the-
leader theory to demonstrate how the entry mode choice of first-movers among Japanese 
manufacturers influenced other manufacturers to follow. Henisz and Delios (2001) found 
that imitation helped reduce uncertainty when choosing foreign plant locations; once one 
business made the first move into a certain location, other businesses followed.  
Extending the empirical findings and theoretical ideas of imitation (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993; Henisz & Delios, 2001), this paper pushes those theories 
into the least developed countries to explain why multinational enterprises do business in 
those countries. 
Furthermore, the knowledge-based view of the firm originally brought up the 
argument that firms expanded into foreign locations for knowledge, both because the 
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firms had knowledge that was marketable in the new region and because firms could gain 
knowledge about the region (Kogut & Zander, 1993). 
Given that imitation and isomorphism have a time component, the number of 
multinational affiliates within a country could be related to the founding date of the first 
multinational enterprise affiliation. Given that multinational firms expand to gain and sell 
knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993), and that firms then imitate each other (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001), we would expect that, once one firm entered a country, other firms would 
also enter the same country. Therefore,  
Hypothesis 1. The longer any one multinational enterprise has an affiliate in the 
least developed country, the greater the total number of multinational affiliates will be in 
that country. 
3.2 KNOWLEDGE FLOWS WITHIN COUNTRIES 
Kogut and his co-authors (Kogut, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1993) argued that 
knowledge was one of the main reason firms existed. Furthermore, as Kostova (1999) 
points out, multinational enterprises must, above all else, manage the knowledge flows 
within the business to somehow capitalize on the economies of scale associated with 
crossing national boundaries. 
However, Kogut (1991) argued that knowledge flows more readily within a 
country’s borders than across borders. Yet, multinational enterprises exist and are 
profitable. Again, the mere fact that multinational enterprises are profitable would 
encourage other multinational enterprises to follow (Haveman, 1993). The question then 
is not whether other multinational enterprises will follow profitable trail-blazers, but 
which multinational enterprises will follow the trail-blazers. According to the 
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permeability-of-borders argument (Kogut, 1991), we would expect to see more 
multinational enterprises from similar countries entering a particular market than 
multinational enterprises from other countries. 
Because the permeability of knowledge flows for firms is greater within a home 
country’s borders than across country borders (Kogut, 1991), imitation within home 
country borders would be faster than imitation across borders. This could happen for two 
reasons, perhaps even at the same time. First, multinational enterprises that are close in 
distance to each other would put more isomorphic pressure on each other, intentionally or 
not, to expand to similar regions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
Second, multinational enterprises from the same home country would be better positioned 
to observe the first-movers from their home countries. At the very least, knowledge flows 
would happen through observation. Furthermore, knowledge flows could happen directly 
between firms in home countries (Kogut, 1991), whether by cross-contact between 
employees of competing firms within the same social circles or by deliberate contact 
amongst firms within coordinated market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; McDermott, Corredoira, & Kruse, 2009; Witt & Redding, 2009).  
As a simple extension of the various arguments above, once one multinational 
enterprise entered one of the least developed countries, other multinational enterprises of 
the same national origin as the first should enter the same least developed country. At any 
given point in time, the number of multinational firms from one home country doing 
business in a least developed country should be somewhat correlated with the date of the 
earliest mover. Furthermore, the multinational enterprises from the same home country 
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should show similar entry modes (greenfield, joint venture, acquisition) to each other. In 
other words: 
Hypothesis 2. The longer any one multinational enterprise from a particular home 
country has an affiliate in a least developed country, the greater the total number of 
multinational affiliates from that particular home country will be in that particular least 
developed country. 
3.3 KNOWLEDGE FLOWS WITHIN INDUSTRIES 
Along with the debates of knowledge flows between firms within countries, there 
is much debate over how knowledge flows within industries (Henisz & Delios, 2001; 
McDermott et al., 2009). Several industrial cluster studies have examined how clusters 
form (McDermott et al., 2009) and how industries become isomorphic (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This paper applies the general idea that knowledge does flow, however it 
does, between firms within industries. Furthermore, we would expect knowledge flows to 
be even greater amongst firms within industries within the same country (Henisz & 
Delios, 2001; Kogut, 1991). Even at the most basic level of knowledge flow—
observation—we would expect a higher level of imitation amongst firms within the same 
industry and the same country.  
Within countries, firms in industry clusters imitate one another (Henisz & Delios, 
2001). Extending this imitation logic directly to multinational enterprises in the least 
developed countries, we would expect more foreign affiliates from similar industries and 
similar home countries in any particular country. When we look at the least developed 
countries, the compound theories of knowledge flows, imitation, and isomorphism 
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predict that there would be more multinational firms in the least developed countries due 
to early-movers from similar countries within similar industries. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 3. The longer any one multinational enterprise from a particular 
industry in a particular home country has an affiliate in a least developed country, the 
greater the total number of multinational affiliates in that industry from that particular 
home country will be in that particular least developed country. 
3.4 SERVING THE POOR PROFITABLY 
Can multinational businesses make a profit while also serving the poorest areas of 
the world? This question is at the heart of a debate among researchers and practitioners, 
both social and business (Kolk et al, 2014). Kolk et al. (2014) summarized a decade of 
research on the topic of base-of-the-pyramid or bottom-of-the-pyramid. The original 
argument posed by Prahalad and co-authors was that 4 billion people lived on less than 
$1,000 annually. In a Harvard Business Review article, Prahalad and Hart (2002) 
illustrated three economic levels—high-income, middle income, and low income—using 
a pyramid. They referred to the poorest 4 billion people as the base of the world’s 
economic pyramid (Prahalad & Hart, 2002). 
Despite the original suggest that large multinationals could have a tremendous 
impact on global poverty while still making a profit, the base-of-the-pyramid literature 
took many divergent paths (Kolk et al, 2014). On one side of the debate is Prahalad’s 
original suggestion in the business research literature that large multinational businesses 
could (and, perhaps, should) consider serving the poorest of the world, the “base of the 
pyramid,” and that they could do so profitably (Kolk et al, 2014; Prahalad & Hart, 2002; 
Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998).  
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On the opposite side of the debate is Karnani’s view that the most basic needs of 
the poor can only be met through proper governmental reforms and programs (Karnani, 
2008; Kolk et al, 2014). Karnani’s main arguments revolved around alleviating the 
deplorable conditions under which the poor lived, including access to clean water and the 
abysmal lack of any kind of sanitary method for dealing with raw sewage in the streets 
(Karnani, 2008). Others in the social literature have pointed to violent entrepreneurism 
and the lack of governments to maintain law and order (Ault & Spicer, 2016). The issues 
of poverty alleviation are enormous. However, we must leave that debate aside for now. 
In between the seemingly extreme and irreconcilable views of Prahalad and 
Karnani, research quickly moved on to smaller and medium sized firms, local 
entrepreneurial ventures, and microlending (Kolk et al, 2014). All but forgotten was 
Prahalad’s original question: can multinational enterprises profitably serve the world’s 
poor? 
In this paper, we return to the original question of multinationals serving the 
poorest areas of the world while still being profitable. In doing so, I add two dimensions 
to this debate. First, using data from the United Nations (UNCTAD, 2011), I examine 
multinational affiliates within the least developed countries. These multinationals can be 
large, small, or medium. The UN defines a multinational affiliate as doing business 
within a least developed country and being at least fifty percent owned by an entity 
outside of the host country. These affiliate owners come from the most advanced 
countries, developing countries, and even other least developed countries. Using the 
employment numbers reported by the UN, we find that the affiliates themselves can range 
in size from one employee to thousands of employees, thus we have a full range of large, 
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small, and medium sized firms (UNCTAD, 2011). Second, I use a multilevel, 
hierarchical, random coefficient modeling to examine whether systematic conditions at 
the firm, industry, and country levels explain the variation in the employment numbers of 
these multinational affiliates.
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE AND METHOD
Several researchers have pointed out that it is mathematically impossible to 
understand the underlying individual correlations by only looking at aggregated data. 
There are just too many combinations of individual data that can add up to an aggregate 
total. Only by examining individual data, along with aggregate data, can researchers 
begin to make inferences about individual behaviors (Robinson, 1950; Thorndike, 1939; 
Bliese & Hanges, 2004; Diez-Roux, 1998). 
This study uses a random coefficient model (also known as multi-level modeling 
modeling) to study as prescribed by Bliese & Ployhart, 2002, and Singer & Willet, 2003. 
4.1 SAMPLE 
My sample is 717 foreign affiliates in the least developed countries as of 2010 
from the 2011 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report 
on foreign investment in the least developed countries (UNCTAD, 2011). The United 
Nations (UN) defines Least Developed Countries as those countries which have “low 
income,” “human assets weakness,” and “economic vulnerability” (UNCTAD, 2010: iii). 
A foreign affiliate is any operation that is at least fifty-percent owned by a resident in 
another country than the host country. The resident could be an individual, family, or 
organization. Of the forty-nine least developed countries in 2010, forty-one had at least 
one foreign affiliate. The foreign affiliates represent 190 industries and fifty-eight home 
countries. Foreign affiliates in the least developed countries have parent companies 
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around the world, including four of the least developed countries. This sample is of 
foreign affiliates, including joint ventures, acquisitions, and green-field investments 
(UNCTAD, 2011). 
The UN data includes several key pieces of information at the affiliate level 
within the least developed countries: affiliate name, home and host countries, industry, 
revenues, number of employees, and year of first entry into the host country (UNCTAD, 
2010). I then add country level variables from various sources: economic (World Bank, 
2016a) and institutional (Ault & Spicer, 2014, 2016; World Bank, 2016b). Table 4.1 
shows the country-level variables by country for the least developed countries in this 
sample. Number of firms per country (717 total firms) is as reported by the United 
Nations (UNCTAD, 2011). GNI Per Capita is the Gross National Income per capita for 
2010 using the Atlas method, as reported by the World Bank (2017a). State Fragility 
Index is an average of World Governance Indicators (Ault & Spicer, 2014, 2016; World 
Bank, 2016b). Means of GNI per capita and State Fragility Scores as well as spread also 
shown. Countries listed are Least Developed Countries with foreign affiliates as defined 
in the United Nations report (UNCTAD, 2011). 
While the UN report tried to collect revenue and employment information on each 
multinational affiliate, the report gives sales revenue of only 142 of the affiliates. Out of 
the 717 affiliates, 431 had employee numbers, and 416 had the year established. To 
maximize the effect of the analysis, I used the employment numbers and year established 
to assess firm-level effects. Then, using missing data methods prescribed by Cohen & 
Cohen (1983), I include the full sample of 717 affiliates to examine country-level effects. 
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics of the sample. 
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In addition to employment information, the UN also reported the specific, four-
digit industry codes for each foreign affiliate (UNCTAD, 2011). I broke down these 
industry codes by industry, industry group, industry major group, and industry division. 
Table 4.3 shows a breakdown of the number of firms and number of employees per 
industry major group and industry division. Table 4.3 also shows percentages of the total 
number of firms and employees by division with additional breakdown by major group 
classification. 
4.2 METHODS 
Multilevel modeling (or mixed-effects modeling) allows researchers to study 
nested data—data that contains biased errors due to non-independence. Most individuals 
(or groups) live within a particular context; that context may influence the actual data—
for example, school children grouped within a classroom, employees within a 
department, or businesses within industries. Each of the larger group contexts 
(classrooms, departments, industries) may influence the individuals (school children, 
employees, businesses). Grouped data or group characteristics are Level-2 predictors. 
Multilevel modeling methods enable analysts to calculate which group characteristics are 
influencing the individual (Level-1) data. These methods estimate what amount of 
standard error variance in a regression analysis is attributable to the group as 
distinguished from the individual (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Bliese & Hanges, 2004; 
Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). 
4.3.1 Analysis 
This study will follow the multilevel modeling procedures (Bliese, 2014). Bliese 
and Ployhart (2002) document a specific step-by-step sequence; the authors lay out a 
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succinct outline (2002, 380). Other publications also list slightly altered sequences 
(Singer & Willett, 2003; Bliese, McGurk, Thomas, Balkin, & Wesensten, 2007; Bliese, 
Wesensten, & Balkin, 2006; Lang & Bliese, 2009; Rupp, Wesensten, Bliese, & Balkin, 
2009; Kim & Ployhart, 2014). 
I conducted the analysis on the data using the open-sourced R statistical program 
(R Foundation for Statistical Computing), the nlme library developed by Pinheiro and 
Bates (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), and the multilevel package as described in Bliese (2013). 
Some graphical modeling was created using the lattice library. 
4.3.2 Standard Regression 
Starting with very simple models, this study adds complexity one step at a time 
and compares the statistical outcomes, looking for a best model fit. When the significance 
is clear, the analysis continues with the next step. When outcomes suggest two possible 
directions to proceed, this paper gives reasoning for continuing in each direction and 
logic for why one model should be selected over another model. The goal is to find an 
empirical regression model that explains the most variance in standard error while still 
allowing for the predictability of the model (Singer & Willett, 2003; Bliese, et al., 2007; 
Bliese, et al., 2006; Lang & Bliese, 2009; Rupp, et al., 2009). 
The general outline followed here includes two phases. The first is the Level-1 
phase. In this phase, we check whether multinational affiliate employment numbers differ 
significantly from each other, building in various tests for errors. The second phase 
incorporates country characteristics that are specific to the country regardless of the 
firm’s presence. This is the Level-2 phase (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). 
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Prior to beginning the multilevel model using random coefficients, we should 
look at a standard regression. First we must make sure that the data is in a format that 
allows for analysis, or univariate form (Singer & Willet, 2003). Then we look at a basic 
regression. Once those results are confirmed, we can move on to the mixed effects 
modeling. 
4.3.3 Mixed Effects Modeling 
A mixed effects model, using both fixed and randomized effects, may help to 
create a better model. The final model should take into account several factors, such as 
differences between countries and industries, non-idependence of data, and 
autocorrelation of data (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003). 
Step 1: The first step is to find the Inter-class Correlation for the individuals, what 
the literature refers to as the ICC (1). The ICC is an estimate of how much of the total 
variance we can attribute to the variance within the countries individually (Bliese, 2002). 
We create a null model using only number of employees and allowing for a random 
intercept for each country; then we look at the variance correlation of the null model. By 
dividing the variance of the intercept by the total variance (intercept variance + residual 
variance), we can estimate what percent of the total variance is attributable to variance 
within the individuals. 
Step 2: Once we know that some percentage of the total variance is explained by 
the variance within countries, we can go ahead with a fixed effects model that regresses 
employment on other variables, allowing for random intercepts by country.  
Step 3: We can test to see if allowing the slopes to vary by country will also help 
us get a better fit. We want to use as simple of a model as possible. So, we use the best 
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significant model in step 2 and add another variable as a random effect. Once we run the 
models, we compare -2 log-likelihoods to see if there is a significant difference from a 
model with a fixed effect variable and a random intercept to a model with that variable as 
both a fixed effect and a random effect. 
Step 4: Accounting for Error: The fourth step, and final Level-1 step, is where we 
check for other possible errors, such as autocorrelation and heteroscedacity (Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002). First, a quick check for heteroscedacity reveals that there is sufficient 
variance across the variable in question (see Figure 4). After that, we move on to 
autocorrelation. 
Phase 2: Level-2 Effects: According to Bliese and Ployhart, the most difficult part 
is now done (Bliese & Ployhart, 2003). We now look to add the Level-2, country 
characteristics. First, we add any variables as fixed effects and check the ANOVA. We 
then check for any interaction between the variables. 
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Table 4.1 Country Level Variables: Least Developed Countries. 
 
Country 
Foreign 
Affiliates 
GNI Per 
Capita 
State Fragility 
Index 
Afghanistan 16  500  -1.75863 
Angola 28  3,240  -1.00941 
Bangladesh 16  780  -0.84504 
Benin 15  310  -0.30483 
Burkina Faso 22  2,690  -0.28281 
Burundi 5  780  -1.17341 
Cambodia 27  780  -0.86264 
Central African Republic 4  780  -1.30123 
Chad 8  910  -1.36653 
Congo, Democratic Republic of 24  310  -1.66988 
Djibouti 3  380  -0.60504 
Equatorial Guinea 14  310  -1.24419 
Eritrea 4  380  -1.40115 
Ethiopia 19  380  -0.94244 
Gambia 9  590  -0.51915 
Guinea 29  400  -1.25527 
Guinea-Bissau 4  350  -1.02275 
Haiti 11  400  -1.16096 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 11  400  -0.98484 
Lesotho 7  1,330  -0.11656 
Liberia 15  250  -0.76341 
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Table 4.1 Country Level Variables: Least Developed Countries (continued). 
 
Country Firms 
GNI Per 
Capita 
State Fragility 
Index 
Madagascar 29  420  -0.75116 
Malawi 26  430  -0.29093 
Mali 16  690  -0.41417 
Mauritania 9  1,130  -0.89216 
Mozambique 59  460  -0.27204 
Myanmar 30  780  -1.74353 
Nepal 23  540  -0.88964 
Niger 10  350  -0.70135 
Rwanda 6  560  -0.26264 
Senegal 41  1,050  -0.44477 
Sierra Leone 9  910  -0.68144 
Solomon Islands 23  780  -0.46726 
Somalia 1 N/A -2.32977 
Sudan 13  1,250  -1.60564 
Togo 16  450  -0.88976 
Uganda 30  2,690  -0.57967 
United Republic of Tanzania 20  2,690  -0.36147 
Vanuatu 24  540  0.24257 
Yemen 17  1,180  -1.26775 
Zambia 24  1,320  -0.36100 
  
 
2
1
 
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics. 
 
      
Variables Obs. Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev. 
Employees 431 939 100 1 86,900 5,747 
Year of Establishment 416 1985 1993 1865 2010 21 
2010 GNI per Capita, 
Atlas Method 716 948 575 250 3,240 820 
State Fragility Index 717 -0.7710612 -0.7511598 -2.3297680 0.2425688 0.4973517 
  
 
2
2
 
Table 4.3 Industry Divisions and Major Groups.      
      
 Firms Percent  Employees Percent 
Construction      
Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders 11 1.53%  3,213 0.79% 
Construction Special Trade Contractors 4 0.56%  169 0.04% 
Heavy Construction Other Than Building Construction Contractors 8 1.12%  2,730 0.67% 
Construction Total 23 3.21%  6,112 1.51% 
      
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate      
Depository Institutions 26 3.63%  94,117 23.26% 
Holding and Other Investment Offices 5 0.70%  2,184 0.54% 
Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service 1 0.14%  125 0.03% 
Insurance Carriers 9 1.26%  139 0.03% 
Non-depository Credit Institutions 2 0.28%  4 0.00% 
Real Estate 4 0.56%  207 0.05% 
Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges, and Services 2 0.28%  38 0.01% 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate Total 49 6.83%  96,814 23.93% 
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Table 4.3 Industry Divisions and Major Groups (continued).      
      
 Firms Percent  Employees Percent 
Manufacturing      
Apparel and Other Finished Products Made from Fabrics 6 0.84%  10,210 2.52% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 23 3.21%  6,759 1.67% 
Electronic and Other Electrical Equipment and Components, Except Computer 1 0.14%  220 0.05% 
Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Transportation Equipment 4 0.56%  319 0.08% 
Food and Kindred Products 28 3.91%  60,175 14.87% 
Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment 4 0.56%  6,501 1.61% 
Leather and Leather Products 1 0.14%  200 0.05% 
Lumber and Wood Products, Except Furniture 3 0.42%  1,700 0.42% 
Measuring, Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments;  1 0.14%  1,850 0.46% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 1 0.14%  . . 
Paper and Allied Products 1 0.14%  171 0.04% 
Petroleum Refining and Related Industries 4 0.56%  503 0.12% 
Primary Metal Industries 5 0.70%  214 0.05% 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries 4 0.56%  360 0.09% 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products 5 0.70%  1,170 0.29% 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 8 1.12%  4,790 1.18% 
Textile Mill Products 6 0.84%  6,725 1.66% 
Tobacco Products 7 0.98%  7,504 1.85% 
Transportation Equipment 3 0.42%  1,715 0.42% 
Manufacturing Total 115 16.04%  111,086 27.46% 
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Table 4.3 Industry Divisions and Major Groups (continued).      
      
 Firms Percent  Employees Percent 
Mining      
Coal Mining 2 0.28%  . . 
Metal Mining 15 2.09%  9,655 2.39% 
Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 3 0.42%  640 0.16% 
Oil and Gas Extraction 28 3.91%  10,690 2.64% 
Mining Total 48 6.69%  20,985 5.19% 
      
Public Administration      
Administration of Environmental Quality and Housing Programs 1 0.14%  60 0.01% 
Administration of Human Resource Programs 1 0.14%  . . 
Public Administration Total 2 0.28%  60 0.01% 
      
Retail Trade      
Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 5 0.70%  295 0.07% 
Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, and Mobile Home Dealers 1 0.14%  86 0.02% 
Eating and Drinking Places 2 0.28%  215 0.05% 
Food Stores 2 0.28%  1,800 0.44% 
Home Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment Stores 1 0.14%  20 0.00% 
Miscellaneous Retail 6 0.84%  68 0.02% 
Retail Trade Total 17 2.37%  2,484 0.61% 
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Table 4.3 Industry Divisions and Major Groups (continued).      
      
 Firms Percent  Employees Percent 
Services      
Automotive Repair, Services, and Parking 3 0.42%  80 0.02% 
Business Services 41 5.72%  12,596 3.11% 
Educational Services 2 0.28%  . . 
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and Related Services 29 4.04%  15,852 3.92% 
Health Services 2 0.28%  . . 
Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging Places 10 1.39%  1,129 0.28% 
Legal Services 3 0.42%  160 0.04% 
Membership Organizations 1 0.14%  . . 
Miscellaneous Repair Services 1 0.14%  580 0.14% 
Miscellaneous Services 36 5.02%  493 0.12% 
Motion Pictures 1 0.14%  50 0.01% 
Social Services 1 0.14%  21 0.01% 
Services Total 130 18.13%  30,961 7.65% 
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Table 4.3 Industry Divisions and Major Groups (continued).      
      
 Firms Percent  Employees Percent 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services      
Communications 26 3.63%  84,760 20.95% 
Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 7 0.98%  1,375 0.34% 
Local and Suburban Transit and Interurban Highway Passenger Transport 1 0.14%  30 0.01% 
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 1 0.14%  200 0.05% 
Railroad Transportation 1 0.14%  878 0.22% 
Transportation by Air 3 0.42%  . . 
Transportation Services 36 5.02%  9,147 2.26% 
Water Transportation 17 2.37%  588 0.15% 
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Serv Total 92 12.83%  96,978 23.97% 
      
Wholesale Trade      
Wholesale Trade-durable Goods 81 11.30%  28,672 7.09% 
Wholesale Trade-non-durable Goods 57 7.95%  4,214 1.04% 
Wholesale Trade Total 138 19.25%  32,886 8.13% 
      
Unknown 103 14.37%  6,191 1.53% 
Grand Total 717 100.00%  404,557 100.00% 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS
To conduct this multilevel analysis, I first used an ANOVA to verify the level of 
variation that existed among and between the countries. Interestingly, when I examined 
the firm size (based on employment) variations, there was no variation attributable to the 
host countries at large. A multilevel analysis splits the total variation into multiple levels, 
both between groups and within groups. The between-group variation shows how much 
variation in employment is attributable to the country-level conditions. The within-group 
variation shows much variation in employment is attributable to the firm-level conditions. 
However, if no little to no variation exists between groups, then there is no reason to look 
for conditions of non-variation. I group the affiliate firms by host country and, separately, 
by home country. There was no significant variation of employment due to the either host 
or home countries. 
Finally, some industries might have higher employment than others. I grouped the 
foreign affiliates by industry at four different levels: industry, industry group, industry 
major group, and industry division, as defined by the UN Report (UNCTAD, 2011). 
Table 4.3 shows the breakdown of employment numbers by the industry major groups 
and the industry divisions. I then created null models to see how much variation in 
employment could be attributable to the industries. None of the industry groupings 
showed significant between-group variation. 
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Table 5.1 shows the variance results of the above null models, both between-
group and within-group variances for each model. I also show the two intraclass-
correlation coefficients (ICC) for each grouping model. ICC (1) is the percentage of total 
variance attributable to the between-group variance; ICC (2) is a measure of the group 
means (Bliese, 2000; Bryk & Raudenbush, 1982). For each null model above, the 
between-group variance is extremely small compared to the within-group variance 
especially in the null models for host country, home country, industry, and industry 
group. The between-group variances for industry major group and industry division are 
much larger than the other four models. Yet, the largest ICC (1) estimate is just over half 
of a percentage. I reported the ICCs as decimals to the ninth decimal place to show just 
how small these estimates are. An ICC (1) should be above 0.2, and an ICC (2) should be 
above 0.5 (Bliese, 2014). 
Because there is no significant variation between the least developed countries, 
the multinational enterprises’ home countries, or industries, there is no reason to move on 
to the more complex multilevel modeling. Multilevel modeling allows us to look at the 
possible causes of variation of a lower-level variable which are attributable to higher-
level groupings. If the groupings have no significant bearing on the lower level variable 
under examination, then an ordinary least squares or general least squares regression is 
best (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). 
Since the multilevel groupings showed no indication of having any influence on 
the variation in the number of employees of affiliates of multinational enterprises, I ran 
an ordinary least squares regression of employment on year established, host country 
indicators, home country indicators, and industry indicators. The results were non-
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significant. A few models had intercepts that were significantly different than zero. Table 
5.2 shows the results of seven different models. Models 5-7 include host country 
indicator variables. The other four models included no other indicator variables. I also ran 
other models with indicator variables for home countries and for the various industry 
groupings. None were significant. 
These results point one possible conclusion: businesses are so idiosyncratic that 
some multinationals can have profitable affiliates in even poorest countries of the world. I 
discuss this and other possibilities in the next chapter.
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Table 5.1 Null Model Between and Within-Group Variances and ICC Estimates. 
   
  
Group 
Between-Group 
Variance 
Within-Group 
Variance 
ICC (1) 
Estimate 
ICC (2) 
Estimate 
Host Country 0.27 33,030,040 0.000000008 0.000000087 
Home Country 0.30 33,030,040 0.000000009 0.000000073 
Industry 4.73 34,501,890 0.000000137 0.000000384 
Industry Group 4.50 34,501,890 0.000000130 0.000000489 
Industry Major 
Group 185,424.00 34,325,886 0.005372847 0.035212560 
Industry Division 112,827.90 34,410,149 0.003268197 0.121601300 
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Table 5.2 Multivariate Analysis: Employment      
 
     
 
    
Host Country Indicators 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Year of Establishment -5.1960 -6.1619   -10.4354   
 (-0.428) (-0.517)   (-0.872)   
GNI per Capita, 2010 
(Atlas Method) 
-0.1983  -0.1733   0.2685  
(-0.766)  (-0.813)   (0.469)  
State Fragility 140.0160   138.2704   157.5579 
 (0.253)   (0.306)   (0.468) 
        
Constant 11,634.5271 13,237.6986 1,117.7888** 1,046.4220* 20,945.4897 432.7266 844.0863** 
 (0.492) (0.559) (2.350) (1.897) (0.874) (0.742) (2.027) 
        
Observations 377 377 430 431 377 430 431 
Adjusted R-squared -0.007 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.088 -0.075 -0.077 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION
This paper takes a multilevel approach to examine possible reasons why 
multinational enterprises have affiliates in the least developed countries. Several 
literature streams in international business have looked at the macro influences on firms’ 
choices to enter or avoid the least developed countries. 
This paper is the next step towards understanding business in the context of the 
least developed countries. Further research may include understanding spill-over effects 
of foreign multinationals presence in the least developed countries. Does the presence of 
foreign multinational enterprises have a positive influence on the surrounding economic 
development where they do business? Do the firms use local employees? Does the 
employment of local employees help spur local economic growth? Do local 
entrepreneurial ventures rise because of multinational enterprises being present? Do 
knowledge transfers and spillovers from foreign multinationals foster new developing-
country multinational enterprises? 
One especially important aspect of international business in the least developed 
countries that needs further study is whether multinational enterprises have any local 
effects on local economies and any national effect on national economies. This is the 
logical next step.  
It is possible that these foreign enterprises are locating only in business-friendly 
locations, such as port cities, as Karnani suggested. However, the UN data available for 
  
33 
 
this analysis is missing location information. A more advanced dataset could include 
specific affiliate location within a country. Then, further analysis could connect that 
information to within-country population data to test that assumption. 
Additional work still needs to link affiliates within the dataset to parent 
companies, thus identifying multinational enterprise experience across several countries. 
In some instances, this connection is simply to achieve since affiliates share parent 
company names, such as Maersk Oil Angola and Toyota Uganda Ltd. Finding the parents 
of other affiliates is a bit more challenging. Yet, this information would help us 
understand more idiosyncratic nature of multinational firms’ experiences conducting 
business across borders, even into the least developed countries. 
For example, CFAO Motors is a division of the CFAO Group, a French 
multinational enterprise. CFAO Motors claims to be the largest sales and service network 
in Africa with “about 6,100 employees, 133 sales and service locations in 33 African 
countries, 3 French overseas territories (French Guiana, New Caledonia and Reunion), 
Vietnam and Cambodia” (CFAO, 2017). According to the UN’s 2010 report, CFAO 
Motors was in seven of the least developed countries, while the CFAO Group was in 
eleven of the least developed countries (UNCTAD, 2011). 
CFAO Motors sells a variety of vehicle brands: Chevrolet, Toyota, Suzuki, 
Mitsubishi, and Yamaha, to name a few. Their website shows pictures of pristine, state-
of-the-art show rooms, showcasing brand new vehicles, even in the poorest countries. 
According to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Burkina Faso’s gross 
national income per capita (GNI, Atlas method) was $589.70 in 2010 (World Bank, 
2016a). How could people within such a poor country afford a new Toyota vehicle? 
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Perhaps, Karnani (2008) was right: the multinationals are locating in large urban areas 
and are catering to the wealthiest residents. 
Yet, a closer look at the Burkina Faso webpage on CFAO’s website shows 
another clue to the story: 
CFAO Motors Burkina was set up in 1973 and is the exclusive Burkinabe 
distributor for four internationally renowned brands: Toyota, Peugeot, Suzuki and 
Yamaha. It sells a broad range of new passenger and commercial vehicles as well as 
motorcycles and electricity generators manufactured by Yamaha. CFAO Motors Burkina 
also operates a car rental service in partnership with Avis (CFAO, 2017, italics added). 
Yes, CFAO Motors may indeed sell vehicles to the wealthiest residents. However, 
it also sells motorcycles and generators. New vehicle dealers in the United States sell new 
and used vehicles, but not motorcycles and certainly not generators. Another item of note 
is that even the showcase images on CFAO’s website show only a few models in stock. 
Compare that to vehicle dealers in the United States with hundreds of vehicles on their 
lots. 
The CFAO Motors story is also further idiosyncratic: they sell multiple vehicle 
brands and even vary their brand choices depending on the country. CFAO Motors is a 
specialty international distributor with unique experience doing business in underserved 
countries. And, the CFAO story seems more than just a case study. Several multinational 
enterprises serve specific, underserved markets. 
And, that is probably the real story: people succeed at doing business all around 
the world. Unique people, creating unique firms to serve unique populations.
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